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KASSERINE
Number 134
3 4
9
770306
154080
£3.95
NUMBER 134
© Copyright
After the Battle
2006
Editor-in-Chief: Winston G. Ramsey
Managing Editor: Gordon Ramsey
Editor: Karel Margry
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In mid-February 1943, the Germans launched a two-pronged attack against the
US II Corps in western Tunisia. In the north, the 5. Panzerarmee under Generaloberst
Hans-Jürgen von Arnim burst through the Faïd Pass with two armoured divisions tak-
ing Sidi Bouzid and starting a drive for Sbeïtla (Operation ‘Frühlingswind’). In the
south, Kampfgruppe DAK (Deutsches Afrikakorps) under Feldmarschall Erwin Rommel
followed this up by taking Gafsa (Operation ‘Morgenluft’). Taking the Americans by
surprise, and inflicting heavy losses on them, the Germans achieved a complete break-
through and by February 18 their two forces had linked up in front of the Kasserine
Pass. Sensing a chance to achieve an even bigger victory, Rommel attacked through
the pass on the 19th, sending his spearheads both north towards El Kef and north-
west towards Tébessa. Fierce fighting raged in the pass and on the two roads leading
out of it for several days, but the Allies, rallying all available reserves, narrowly held
on. By February 22 the German offensive had run its course. Rommel called off the
attack, and ordered his forces to retire to their starting positions.
EL KEF
MAKTAR
KAIROUAN
TÉBESSA
CONTENTS
KASSERINE
UNLUCKY BAPTISM OF FIRE
MWO FOR THE
POLISH PARA BRIGADE
2
41
54
GAFSA
Front Cover:
The German offensive in Tunisia that
became known as the Battle for the Kasserine Pass
lasted from February 15 to 22, 1943. Taking the green
American troops completely by surprise, it inflicted
heavy losses on the Allies in men and material until it
eventually ran out of steam west of the Kasserine
Pass. On February 26, with the tide of war reversed,
Signal Corps photographer McGray pictured troops of
the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, moving
back down to the embattled pass. (USNA)
Inset:
The
same spot today along the P13 road from Tébessa.
(Jean Paul Pallud).
Centre Pages:
Map of the German offensive in western
Tunisia, showing the German advance from the Faïd
Pass, through Sidi Bouzid and Sbeïtla to the Kasserine
Pass and the subsequent fighting on the Thala and
Tébessa roads, February 14-22, 1943. The map is
reproduced from
The Mediterranean and the Middle
East, Volume IV: The Destruction of the Axis Forces in
Africa
(HMSO, London, 1966), a volume of the British
Official History of the war.
Back Cover:
The ceremony for the presentation of the
Militaire Willems-Orde, the highest Dutch award for brav-
ery, to the 1st Independent Polish Parachute Brigade for
its role in the Battle of Arnhem took place at the Binnen-
hof, the courtyard of the Dutch Parliament, in The Hague
on May 31, 2006. (RP)
Acknowledgements:
For help with the story on the
MWO for the Polish Para Brigade, the Editor would like
to thank Kolonel (ret) Alex Ligteringen Verstegen, Sec-
retary and Member of the Chapter of the Militaire
Willems-Orde, and Frans Ammerlaan of the Market-
Garden Foundation.
Photo Credits:
ECPAD — Médiathèque de la Défense,
Paris; IWM — Imperial War Museum, London; RP —
Royal Portraits Netherlands (Bernard Rübsamen); USNA
— US National Archives.
GABÈS
The topography of Tunisia is marked by a mountain chain that forms a vast inverted Y.
The solid stem extends northwards to Cap Bon, and the fork is just south of El Fahs.
One prong, the Eastern Dorsale, projects southward for over 200 kilometres to the
town of Maknassy while a still longer extension to the south-west, the Western Dor-
sale, reaches beyond Fériana. The Eastern Dorsale can be crossed at only five gaps and
passes — at Pichon, Fondouk, Faïd, Aïn Rebaou and Maknassy — or around the south-
ern end along the road leading north-west from Gabès. Similarly, there are only four
mountain passes crossing the Western Dorsale — at Maktar, Sbiba, Kasserine and
Fériana. All of these passes would come to play vital roles in the February 1943 battle.
The Mediterranean theatre of operations
opened in 1940 when Italy tried to expand its
African colonies. The venture quickly turned
into disaster with a sound British rebuff, and
the Italian defeat prompted Hitler to dis-
patch a small force to Africa. Starting in Feb-
ruary 1941, the victories of the Deutsches
Afrikakorps against the British Eighth Army
led to a steady trickle of reinforcements of
the German contingent, but never enough
for a decisive edge. To Hitler, North Africa
remained a peripheral theatre of operations.
Contrarily, from the beginning it was of
major importance in the British imperial
grand strategy as the Mediterranean formed
the vital link to the Middle East and India via
the Suez Canal. The desert campaign
remained at a stalemate in Libya through
most of 1941 and early 1942 with the front
shifting east and west whenever either side
enjoyed temporary advantages in forces and
supplies. Following Germany’s invasion of
the Soviet Union in June 1941, North Africa
became even more secondary to the German
high command and the balance of forces
there progressively swung in Britain’s favour.
2
Kasserine came as a terrible blow to the Americans, a setback
that struck the American home front with shocked disbelief. In
their first battle against the German Wehrmacht the US Army
had suffered a humiliating rout. Led by an incompetent corps
commander, who had spread his forces too thin and commit-
ted his reserves piecemeal, the green and inexperienced GI sol-
diers proved no match for the veteran Wehrmacht troops.
Badly positioned units were left in place too long, causing
them to be cut off and forced to surrender. On two consecutive
days ill-conceived counter-attacks led to the complete
Early in 1942 American President
Franklin D. Roosevelt promised the Rus-
sians that the US Army would begin to fight
the German Army somewhere before the
end of the year. British Prime Minister Win-
ston Churchill insisted that the invasion of
north-west Africa was the only stroke that
could be delivered that autumn. In spite of
opposition from his own Chiefs-of-Staff,
Roosevelt concurred and the decision was
taken in July 1942 to invade that corner of
North Africa.
After more discussions, it was agreed that
Operation ‘Torch’, as it became called,
would include simultaneous landings at
three locations in French North Africa:
Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. The directive
destruction of the tank unit involved. On several occasions,
whole units broke and retreated to the rear in chaos, abandon-
ing their weapons and vehicles. In all, during the week-long
fight, the Americans lost 183 tanks, 208 guns, 194 half-tracks,
560 trucks, 42 aircraft and countless small arms and items of
equipment. The human cost was equally high: 192 men killed,
2,624 wounded and 2,459 taken prisoner.
Left:
A large group of
captured GIs is allowed a rest by their German guards. (ECPAD)
Right:
The same spot on the arid plain between Sbeïtla and
Faïd, found by Jean Paul Pallud in March 2006.
given in August to General Dwight D.
Eisenhower, the American Commander-in-
Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force,
described the ultimate objective of ‘Torch’
as the ‘complete annihilation of Axis forces
By Jean Paul Pallud
now opposing the British forces in the West-
ern Desert’.
The run-up to the February battles had begun three months
earlier. In reaction to the Allied ‘Torch’ landings in north-west
Africa on November 9, 1942, the Axis had begun a massive
build-up of troops and supplies in Tunisia. Between November
1942 and January 1943, a total of nearly 112,000 troops —
81,222 Germans and 30,735 Italians — and over 100,000 tons of
supplies were flown and shipped to Tunisia. At the peak of the
air operation, the daily flight consisted of an average of 200
Junkers Ju 52 and 15 of the huge six-engined Messerschmitt
Me 323 transport aircraft. Here a large formation of Ju 52s
skims low over the Mediterranean on its way to Tunisia.
(ECPAD)
3
A new body, the LXXXX. Armeekorps,
was created in Tunis in mid-November
1942 to command the swiftly increasing
German forces in Tunisia. The headquar-
ters was elevated to that of 5. Pan-
zerarmee on December 8 and a new com-
mander, Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen von
Arnim, then took over. A Silesian aristo-
crat, son of a general, respected and
quiet-spoken, he had previously com-
manded the XXXIX. Panzerkorps on the
Eastern Front. This picture of him was
taken in May 1943, after the capitulation
of the last Axis forces in Tunisia. (IWM)
By late October 1942, the Eighth Army
had secured the initiative in Libya at the sec-
ond battle of El Alamein and German and
Italian forces were in headlong retreat
through Libya. After being away sick for a
month, Feldmarschall Erwin Rommel was
sent back to Africa urgently to resume com-
mand of the Deutsch-Italienische Panzer-
armee (on October 10, Panzerarmee Afrika,
the former Afrikakorps, had been given this
new name).
‘Torch’ was launched on November 8, all
three landings taking place by and large
without serious opposition from French
forces. All fighting ceased on November 11
as a result of orders by Admiral Jean-
François Darlan, the C-in-C of the Armed
Forces of Vichy France, who was then in
Algiers. By that time the Allied beach-head
was secure. Now came the task of driving
eastwards on to Tunisia. The Eastern Task
Force under British Lieutenant-General
Kenneth Anderson (to be officially renamed
British First Army on January 1, 1943) began
to advance from Algeria in an effort to gain
the Bizerte–Tunis area before the Germans
could do so.
The Axis command lost no time reacting
to the Allied landings and as early as the
evening of November 8, preparations were in
full swing to ship ground troops to Tunisia,
primarily Italians, supported by such Ger-
man specialised units as were immediately
available in Italy. Sea and air transport was
temporarily diverted from supplying Rom-
mel’s army in order to rush new units to
Tunisia.
Also, at midnight on November 10/11,
Axis forces began to invade the previously
unoccupied southern part of France. Ten
German divisions, two of which were
armoured, swept across southern France,
and six Italian divisions marched into eastern
France. The French fleet remained at the
base in Toulon, the object of covetous atten-
tion from both Allied and Axis commands
(see
After the Battle
No. 76).
4
On February 9, Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, the Oberbefehlshaber Süd
(German Commander-in-Chief South), came to Tunisia to confer with von Arnim,
Rommel, and Generale Giovanni Messe, the designated commander of the 1a Armata
that was soon to take over the defence of the Mareth Line, to discuss future opera-
tions. Since the beginning of February, Rommel had been advocating that an attack
westwards should be launched to counter an Allied eastward strike to the coast. It
was during the February 9 conference, which took place at the Luftwaffe command
post at Ghannouch (Rhennouch) near Gabès, that the plans for a combined attack by
von Arnim’s 5. Panzerarmee and Rommel’s Kampfgruppe DAK, a composite German
and Italian force of division strength, were formulated, Kesselring ruling that Arnim’s
attack would come first, followed by Rommel’s a day or two later. This picture of
Kesselring and Rommel was taken later in February, at the height of the Kasserine
battle, when Kesselring had come to Kasserine to see Rommel. On the right is Oberst
Fritz Bayerlein, Rommel’s Chief-of-Staff. (ECPAD)
By the end of November there were over
15,000 German and 9,000 Italian troops in
the Bizerte and Tunis areas. On December 8,
a new commander, Generaloberst Hans-Jür-
gen von Arnim, arrived in Tunisia and took
command of these forces under a new head-
quarters designated 5. Panzerarmee.
The Germans had won the race and by
mid-December a stalemate had developed
along the Tunisian frontier, with the Allies
still too weak to overcome the Axis defences,
and the German-Italian forces conducting an
aggressive defence, though they were not
strong enough and too poorly supplied to
drive the enemy back into Algeria.
Anderson’s First Army held the line with
three corps of three different nationalities.
The British V Corps (Lieutenant-General
Charles Allfrey) occupied the northern sec-
tor, from the Mediterranean shore to south
of Bou Arada; the French XIXème Corps
d’Armée (Général Louis Koeltz) the middle
sector from Bou Arada as far south as Hajeb
el Aïoun; and the US II Corps (Major Gen-
eral Lloyd R. Fredendall) kept the line from
there through Sidi Bouzid to Gafsa. The two
southern corps were deployed along the
Eastern Dorsale, the mountain chain that
projects southward across central Tunisia.
In December, Hitler agreed that the con-
duct of operations in Tunisia, as in Libya,
would be the responsibility of the Italian
Comando Supremo, which was based in
Rome. To reach close co-operation between
the two partners, a new German operations
staff was attached to the command.
To mollify his Italian partners, Hitler had
also agreed to their demand that as soon as
the Deutsch-Italienische Panzerarmee
retired into Tunisia, Rommel would be
replaced by an Italian commander. On Janu-
ary 23, 1943, Mussolini designated Generale
d’Armata Giovanni Messe (who had led the
Italian Expeditionary Corps in the East) to
assume command of this new 1a Armata.
Rommel, by then mentally and physically
exhausted and having ‘little desire to go on
any longer playing the scapegoat for a pack
of incompetents’ (as he wrote in his mem-
oirs), initially asked Comando Supremo to
send Messe to Tunisia at once. However he
soon changed his mind, deciding instead
‘only to give up command of the army on
orders, regardless of the state of my health’.
The day before Messe was nominated, it was
decided to defer Rommel’s departure until
his army was firmly established in the
Mareth Line. The change-over was post-
poned a second time on February 18 to
enable Rommel to command the offensive
actions then in course.
The strength of the Axis forces under von
Arnim’s 5. Panzerarmee in Tunisia rose dur-
ing January, reaching a total of about
100,000, of which 74,000 were Germans, and
26,000 Italians. Meanwhile, disregarding
instructions for a last-ditch defence of Libya,
Rommel managed to extricate most of his
much-depleted army into Tunisia. By early
February his Deutsch-Italienische Panzer-
armee — numbering about 30,000 German
and 48,000 Italian troops — was back in the
Mareth Line, an old French fortified area
around Mareth, south-east of Gabès. The
boundary between Rommel’s and von
Arnim’s armies was an east-west line just
north of Gabès.
Fearing an Allied eastward attack towards
Sfax or Gabès, which would divide the two
armies, Comando Supremo asked the
Deutsch-Italienische Panzerarmee to move
forces to the Gabès area to counter the men-
ace. Rommel agreed to send over the 21.
Panzer-Division, which started moving west
on the morning of January 13.
On January 28 Comando Supremo
ordered the 5. Panzerarmee to advance its
left wing to areas more favourable for
defence against the expected Allied attack.
To this end, the army was to go over to the
offensive at three points: the Rebaa Oulad
Yahia valley; the pass through the Eastern
Dorsale at Faïd; and the road centre and
oasis at Gafsa.
Above:
In overall command of Allied operations in North West
Africa was Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Com-
mander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force. His Allied Force
Headquarters (AFHQ) was at Algiers, a long way from the
battlefront in Tunisia, making it difficult to keep a tight rein on
developments. Here, Eisenhower enjoys a C ration during an
inspection tour of the Tunisian front in March 1943. (USNA)
Left:
On January 1, 1943, the Eastern Task Force of Operation
‘Torch’ was renamed British First Army, Lieutenant-General
Kenneth Anderson retaining command. On the 21st Eisen-
hower gave First Army responsibility for co-ordinating the
operations of all British, French and American forces on the
Tunisian front. Here Anderson visits the command post of
Général Louis Koeltz, the commander of the French XIXème
Corps d’Armée, near Maktar. (ECPAD)
Above:
Major General
Lloyd R. Fredendall commanded the US II Corps under Ander-
son. Highly rated in the US Army for his training skill, he
proved to have serious flaws as a combat commander. A loud
and brassy know-all, he was inclined to be critical of superiors
and subordinates alike. He rarely left his command post for
personal visits and reconnaissance, yet was impatient with
recommendations of subordinates more familiar with condi-
tions at the front. His command style was marred by a ten-
dency to phrase his orders in tough-guy slang, often leaving his
subordinates in doubt about his precise intentions. He was
Anglophobe in general, anti-Anderson in particular, and had lit-
tle patience for the French. (USNA)
In early January 1943, the Allies were
indeed preparing plans for a drive by the US
II Corps (part of Anderson’s First Army)
eastwards across Tunisia to the Sfax area.
Code-named Operation ‘Satin’, its objective
was to cut German supply lines in the rear of
Rommel’s army in Libya. However, it soon
became apparent that the Eighth Army
would be unable to support this offensive
because the harbour of Tripoli, through
which it was to be supplied, had been demol-
ished by the Germans and was still being
restored to service. There thus existed the
risk that Rommel would have his hands free
to intervene against the II Corps at Sfax, and
so on January 15 Eisenhower decided to can-
cel ‘Satin’ for the time being.
On January 20, he issued a directive to
Anderson’s First Army that operations on
the southern flank must be defensive and
that the US 1st Armored Division, which
together with French forces formed the main
strength of II Corps, be held ‘well concen-
trated’ in mobile reserve. The decision was
then taken to withdraw the poorly equipped
French forces for re-arming, which required
a new directive issued on the 26th to General
Anderson. Again, Eisenhower insisted that
he ‘deemed it essential that your mobile
striking forces in the south be held well con-
centrated so as to strike en masse when the
need arises’.
US II CORPS RAID AGAINST SENED
Following Eisenhower’s directive of Janu-
ary 20 to act defensively, but failing to note
his insistence to have the bulk of the 1st
Armored Division concentrated, General
Fredendall devised an operation to take
Maknassy, 80 kilometres east of Gafsa on the
road to Sfax, and the pass through the East-
ern Dorsale just east of it.
The 1st Armored Division, commanded by
Major General Orlando Ward, was however
already largely committed to other opera-
tions. Combat Command A (Brigadier Gen-
eral Raymond E. McQuillin) was assembling
near Sbeïtla to join the French in an opera-
tion planned for the 23rd to regain the Fon-
douk gap, and Combat Command B
(Brigadier General Paul M. Robinett) had
orders to move to the Ousseltia valley in sup-
port of another operation by the XIXème
Corps d’Armée. To carry out the Maknassy
attack, General Ward therefore organised a
Combat Command C under Colonel Robert
I. Stack, commander of the 6th Armored
Infantry Regiment, and consisting of one
battalion of the 6th Armored Infantry, one
company of the 81st Reconnaissance Battal-
ion, one company of the 13th Armored Regi-
ment, plus engineers, artillery and signals
contingents.
Before launching the attack on Maknassy,
Fredendall decided to first undertake a hit-
and-run raid on Sened, a railway station vil-
lage halfway to Maknassy along the same
road. Though both General Ward and
Général Joseph Welvert, the commander of
the French Division de Constantine (which
held the II Corps line south of the 1st
Armored), objected that such an operation
would warn the enemy of the planned Mak-
nassy attack, the foray went ahead.
The raiding force started out from Gafsa
at 4 a.m. on January 24. Company C of the
81st Reconnaissance Battalion took up posi-
tion east of the station to stop any enemy
reinforcements coming from Maknassy and
artillery opened up about 11.15 a.m. from a
position to the west. One company of
armoured infantry then advanced from the
west, with tanks and more infantry coming in
from the south. The small hamlet of a few
houses and olive trees was soon taken and by
3 p.m. Combat Command C was assembling
for the return march. Three hours later the
force was back in bivouac near Gafsa. Losses
were quite small, and prisoners totalled 96,
with enemy killed and wounded at Sened
estimated to be about the same number.
II Corps then finalised its plans for the
attack on Maknassy, scheduled for February
1. Combat Command C was to advance
north-eastwards to turn on Maknassy from
the north via the Maïzila Pass while a tempo-
rary Combat Command D under Colonel
5

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