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THE BATTLE OF EL GUETTAR
NO
Number 144
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770306
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IN
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£4.25
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NUMBER 144
© Copyright
After the Battle
2009
Editor-in-Chief: Winston G. Ramsey
Managing Editor: Gordon Ramsey
Editor: Karel Margry
Published by
Battle of Britain International Ltd.,
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On November 8, 1942, Allied forces assaulted western North Africa, landings taking
place simultaneously at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. Three days later, the assault
forces were secure and the Eastern Task Force pressed eastwards, on to Tunisia. An air-
borne operation was launched on November 15 near Tébessa, Algeria, and another on
the 16th at Souk el Arba, Tunisia, and a first clash with Axis forces in Tunisia occurred
at Djebel Abiod on the 17th.
Above:
This M3 Grant medium tank was pictured in a
bivouac area of the US 1st Armored Division near Souk El Arba on November 21.
After the disastrous and humiliating
defeat suffered by the US II Corps in the bat-
tle of Kasserine in southern Tunisia in Feb-
ruary 1943 (see
After the Battle
No. 134), the
Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary
Force in North Africa, General Dwight D.
Eisenhower, felt compelled to relieve the
corps commander, Major General Lloyd R.
Fredendall. Having spread his forces too thin
and committed his reserves piecemeal, Fre-
dendall had directed the operations poorly,
lost control of his corps and also forfeited the
confidence of his troops. Looking for a
replacement, Eisenhower chose Major Gen-
eral George S. Patton, who was then in
Morocco, commanding US I Armored Corps
and busy designing plans for Operation
‘Husky’, the Allied invasion of Sicily, sched-
uled for later that year.
On March 4, Major General Walter Bedell
Smith, Eisenhower’s Chief-of-Staff, tele-
phoned Patton’s headquarters at Rabat. Pat-
ton was out horse-riding, so Smith left an
urgent message to the effect that Patton was
to leave the following day ‘for extended field
duty’. He was to report by air to Algiers tak-
ing along an acting chief-of-staff and two or
more staff officers.
CONTENTS
THE BATTLE OF EL GUETTAR
FROM THE EDITOR
AUSTRALIA
POW Camp No. 13 at Murchison
PERSONALITY
Putting a Name to a Face
2
22
30
50
Front Cover:
The vast, arid expanse of
southern Tunisia, with Djebel Meloussi, as
seen from Sened Station. (Jean Paul Pallud)
Inset:
An M3 light tank of the 13th Armored
Regiment near El Guettar, February 1943.
Centre Pages:
During a running battle in
November 1941, a German armed merchant-
man sank the Australian cruiser HMAS
Sydney.
After they were captured, the
crewmen of the
Kormoran
erected this
memorial to their fallen comrades which still
stands at the site of their POW camp at
Murchison, Australia. (David Green)
Back Cover:
Leslie Sutton, standard bearer for
the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen and
Women in a moment of remembrance at the
dedication of the plaque at Saundersness Road
School, Poplar, in December 2008. (Gail Parker)
Acknowledgements:
For his help with the El
Guettar story, the Editor would like to thank
Tatar Adlene, director of the Hotel Caracalla at
Tébessa (see
hotelcaracalla@yahoo.fr).
For
assistance with the Camp No. 13 story he
extends his appreciation to Arthur and Lurline
Knee of the Tatura & District Historical Society
and to Jeff Thomas, Operations manager at
the Dhurringile Prison, and for help with the
George Shomo story, he thanks Norman S.
Lichtenfeld and Benjamin J. Lucarelli.
Photo Credits:
AWM — Australian War
Memorial, Canberra; BA — Bundesarchiv;
ECPAD — Médiathèque de la Défense, Fort
d’Ivry; IWM — Imperial War Museum, London;
USNA — US National Archives
In mid-February 1943, the Axis forces launched a strong counter-attack against the
US II Corps in south-western Tunisia. The 1st Armored Division’s counter-moves
ended in complete disaster, the division losing two of its tank battalions in two days,
with over 2,500 American soldiers being taken prisoner on February 16 and 17.
Above:
This group of POWs has halted for a rest near the village of Faïd during their
long march eastwards. In the background lies Djebel Bou Dzer with the Faïd Pass on
the left (see
After the Battle
No. 134).
2
ECPAD DAK282 L22
USNA
THE BATTLE OF EL GUETTAR
On March 5, Patton flew to Algiers, leaving
his Deputy, Major General Geoffrey Keyes,
and his Chief-of-Staff, Colonel Hobart R.
Gay, behind to continue the planning for
Sicily and taking with him his planned new
Chief-of-Staff, Brigadier General Hugh J.
Gaffey; his Intelligence Officer, Colonel
Oskar W. Koch; his Operations Officer,
Colonel Kent C. Lambert; his aides, Captain
Richard N. Jenson and Lieutenant Alexander
L. Stiller; and his black orderly, Sergeant W.
George Meeks. Eisenhower, who had himself
flown in from Tébessa, met them on the air-
field and gave Patton his instructions. He was
to take command of II Corps and get it back
on its feet with all possible speed. He was to
restore American prestige, give the soldiers
back their self-respect and prove their ability
to defeat the Germans. He was to have no
qualms about removing inefficient comman-
ders. He was to institute intensive training,
re-equipping, re-organisation, application of
all lessons learnt thus far, and careful plan-
ning of the logistics of attack. Also, his corps
would be fighting under British command
and he should instil in his men a spirit of gen-
uine partnership with the British.
Patton flew on to Constantine to confer
with his new superior, British Lieutenant-
General Sir Harold Alexander, the comman-
der of the 18th Army Group. Formed on Feb-
ruary 19, Alexander’s headquarters
controlled the three Allied formations that
were fighting in North Africa: British Eighth
Army, under Lieutenant-General Bernard
Montgomery, which had driven the German
Afrikakorps westwards out of Libya and into
Tunisia and was now approaching the Ger-
man stop position at the Mareth Line; British
First Army under Lieutenant-General Ken-
neth Anderson, which was in northern
Tunisia, making slow progress eastwards
towards Tunis; and the US II Corps,
deployed in southern Tunisia licking its
wounds after the Kasserine setback. The
corps had fought that battle as part of Ander-
son’s First Army but would now be put under
direct control of 18th Army Group.
By Jean Paul Pallud
On the morning of March 6, ‘erect like a charioteer’ in the lead car of a siren-blaring
cavalcade of armoured vehicles, Major General George S. Patton arrived at Djebel
Kouif, a small mining town 25 kilometres north of Tébessa, to take over command of
II Corps. Then on the 16th, General Eisenhower came to the II Corps headquarters for a
conference during which he confirmed Patton’s recent promotion to lieutenant general
by pinning three stars on him.
3
USNA
USNA
USNA
Jean Paul was unable to trace the location of the award cere-
mony from the records, and the date when these photos were
taken — March 16 — added confusion as this was the day when
Patton left Djebel Kouif to establish his new HQ at Fériana.
Top:
This photo is usually printed to merely show Patton and Eisen-
hower but Jean Paul’s attention was drawn to a faint image
which could be seen through the window.
Left:
He decided to
order an overexposed print centred on the window, with a hope-
lessly dark forefront, but with the outside view now clearly
visible. He then used this print as a clue to search for the location
and finally succeeded, thanks to the help of Tatar Adlene, the
director of the Hotel Caracalla at Tébessa.
Above:
As proven by
this old postcard of 1921, the building seen outside was the
diesel power station of the phosphate mine at Djebel Kouif.
Unfortunately, Tatar Adlene could not gain access to the room
where the photos had been taken in 1943 so instead he took
4
these shots of the derelict power station which has been aban-
doned since the mine closed decades ago.
TATAR ADLENE
TATAR ADLENE
USNA
Three days previously, on March 2, First
Army had already issued a directive to II
Corps which clearly detailed its subsidiary
role: the corps was to stage demonstrating
attacks to draw off enemy reserves from
Eighth Army; to gain control of forward air-
fields from which to furnish assistance to
Eighth Army; and to establish a maintenance
centre at Gafsa from which Eighth Army
could draw supplies once it had broken into
the Gabès plain. The corps’ first mission was
to recover Gafsa from the Italian garrison by
an attack to start not later than March 15.
Troops not required for the defence of Gafsa
could then demonstrate toward Maknassy as
a menace to the Axis’ lines of communica-
tions along the coast.
Following the Kasserine débâcle, which
had revealed the deficiencies of American
units, Alexander was left with a poor opinion
of US troops and lacked confidence in the
capacity of II Corps to execute a full-scale
operation under its own responsibility. While
he appreciated Patton as a colourful leader
who might restore II Corps’ confidence
overnight, he also realised that Patton might
easily be tempted to undertake some rash
offensive move before his men were ready
for another clash with Axis troops. There-
fore, he made sure to carefully proscribe to
TUNIS
KAIROUAN
DJEBEL KOUIF
FONDOUK
KASSERINE
FERIANA
MAKNASSY
SENED STATION
GAFSA
EL GUETTAR
GABES
Patton the limitations of his task. He was to
advance from the Western to the Eastern
Dorsale; seize the town of Gafsa; and take
the key passes leading through the Eastern
Dorsale, at El Guettar (east of Gafsa) and
Maknassy (north-east of Gafsa). However,
he was merely to threaten the Axis flank, not
to proceed beyond the Eastern Dorsale into
the Gabès coastal plain.
Thus, Patton was kept on a very tight rein.
He was given detailed instructions for a very
controlled offensive, which was to be built up
by stages, each stage being increased in scope
as the training, combat experience and
morale of the Americans improved. A few
victories, it was hoped, even though minor,
would bring the performance of American
units up to the required level. To make sure
that Patton would not enter into some over-
ambitious offensive action, Alexander
directed that all II Corps movements were
subject at all times to 18th Army Group’s
approval. As Patton later complained in a
letter to US Army Chief-of-Staff General
George C. Marshall, Alexander specified the
scope of each operation: ‘All I have is the
actual conduct of the operations prescribed.’
Patton did not like Alexander’s limitations at
all but — good soldier that he was — he
grudgingly obeyed.
On the morning of March 6, Patton arrived
at the II Corps command post in the school-
house at Djebel Kouif near Tébessa and for-
mally relieved Fredendall, handing him a
hand-written letter from Eisenhower which
made the change in command official and
final. Fredendall left immediately after-
wards. (He would return to the States, be
promoted to lieutenant general and take
command of an army in training.) Present at
the corps headquarters was Major General
Omar N. Bradley, who had been sent there
by Eisenhower as his ‘eyes and ears’ during
the height of the Kasserine crisis. Patton was
uncomfortable with Bradley’s status and,
5
HMSO

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