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THE BATTLE FOR THE
72>
HOCHWALD GAP
No. 172
9
770306 154103
£5.00
NUMBER 172
© Copyright
After the Battle
2016
Editor: Karel Margry
Editor-in-Chief: Winston G. Ramsey
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On February 26, 1945, having fought its way through the dreaded Reichswald forest,
the First Canadian Army launched Operation ‘Blockbuster’, a continuation of the
massed offensive aimed at securing the Rhineland as far south as Xanten and linking
up with the Americans coming up from the south. For this, the Canadian Army fielded
no less than three armoured and five infantry divisions, both British and Canadian.
Their main obstacle was a German defence line designated the Schlieffen-Stellung but
better known to the Canadians as the ‘Hochwald Layback’. In two weeks of bitter
fighting, confronted by stubbornly opposing units of the 1. Fallschirm-Armee, and in
appalling weather and ground conditions, the Allies slowly pushed from one fortified
town to another, to and through the Hochwald Layback, slowly grinding down their
adversary until they stood on the banks of the Rhine opposite Wesel.
Above and oppo-
site:
Canadian troops and armour advancing towards the town of Calcar.
On February 8, 1945, the First Canadian
Army under Lieutenant-General Harry
Crerar launched Operation ‘Veritable’, a
massive offensive designed to conquer the
northern half of the German Rhineland and
obtain positions favourable for a later assault
across the Rhine. From jump-off positions
near Nijmegen in the Netherlands, British
XXX Corps under Lieutenant-General
Brian Horrocks (operating under Canadian
command) sent three British and two Cana-
dian divisions in a concentrated assault
towards the south-east and into Germany.
Their area of operations was narrow and
constricted by the Rhine river in the north
and the Maas river in the south. Prime obsta-
cle to their advance was the Reichswald for-
est, an impenetrable area of dense woodland
right on the Dutch-German frontier, stretch-
ing some nine miles from east to west and
five miles from north to south. Through it
ran the northern spur of the daunted
Siegfried Line, its defensive fortifications
anchored on the towns of Cleve in the north
and Goch in the south. In two weeks of grim
and costly fighting, the British and Canadi-
ans battled their way through and past the
forest, overcoming mud, rain, floods and
fierce German resistance. On February 15,
having captured Cleve and most of his troops
having emerged from the woods, Crerar
committed the II Canadian Corps under
Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds on the left
flank of his attack, directing the corps to
attack towards Uedem and Xanten. On the
right, XXX Corps, after a stiff battle, cap-
tured Goch on the 21st. (See
After the Battle
No. 159.)
PLANS FOR A RENEWED OFFENSIVE
Operation ‘Veritable’ had gone slowly.
Ground conditions could scarcely have been
worse and the enemy, fighting on the soil of
Germany, had resisted with fierce determi-
nation. The flooding of the Roer river had
prevented the US Ninth Army further south
from launching the converging attack which
had been planned (Operation ‘Grenade’),
and the Germans had been able to concen-
trate their resources on the First Canadian
Army’s front. By February 20 the army had
clawed its way forward between 15 and 20
miles from its start line but the enemy still
maintained an unbroken front, and the so-
called ‘Hochwald Layback’ — a defensive
barrier which the Germans had constructed
behind the Siegfried Line as a stop-gap posi-
tion — was still before the Canadians. It now
seemed necessary to mount a new offensive
with fresh troops to restore the momentum
of the attack and break through to Xanten.
General Crerar had been holding daily
conferences with his corps and divisional
commanders to review progress and issue
orders.1 At the conference on the afternoon
of February 21, held at a convent near
Materborn, the ‘plot’ for the new offensive
was given. On the 22nd the 15th (Scottish)
Division was to attack a wooded area north-
east of Weeze; on the 24th the 53rd (Welsh)
Division was to drive south from Goch, take
Weeze and exploit south-westward. On the
26th the II Canadian Corps (comprising the
2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions)
would launch the operation designed to cap-
ture the Hochwald position and exploit to
Xanten. This was christened ‘Blockbuster’
CONTENTS
OPERATION ‘BLOCKBUSTER’
The Battle for the Hochwald Gap
IT HAPPENED HERE
Major Fred Tilston, VC
FRANCE
Prisoner of War at Brest
2
38
47
Front Cover:
Men of the 4th Welch, 53rd
(Welsh) Division, crossing the Niers river
near the German town of Weeze during
Operation ‘Blockbuster’, the First Canadian
Army’s offensive to clear the northern
Rhineland in February-March 1945 — then
and now. (Karel Margry)
Back Cover:
Tanks of the 4th/7th Dragoon
Guards passing through the small town of
Alpen during the latter stage of ‘Blockbuster’
— an image perpetuated in bronze on the
town fountain. (Karel Margry)
Acknowledgements:
The main text for the
Operation ‘Blockbuster’ story is taken from
The Victory Campaign
(Volume III of the
Official History of the Canadian Army in
the Second World War) by Colonel C. P.
Stacey (Roger Duhamel: Ottawa, 1960)
published by authority of the Canadian
Minister of National Defence. The text of
the Tilston VC story is taken from
Rhineland. The Battle to End the War
by
W. Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker
(Leo Cooper: London, 1991). For help with
the Tilston VC story, the Editor would like
to thank Martijn Bakker, Marco Cillessen,
Johan van Doorn and Ed Storey.
Photo Credit Abbreviations:
IWM —
Imperial War Museum; LAC — Library and
Archives Canada; USNA — US National
Archives.
2
SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF THE ETO
OPERATION ‘BLOCKBUSTER’
THE BATTLE FOR THE HOCHWALD GAP
on February 22. Thus far, Crerar’s army had
fought the battle mainly with infantry divi-
sions but now arrangements were made for
the 4th Canadian and British 11th Armoured
Divisions to come forward to take part; their
GOCs and brigadiers were to come at once
to be ‘put in the picture’ about the plan.
On the 22nd General Simonds presented
his plan to the divisional commanders (no
written operation order was issued). He
emphasised the opportunity presented by the
availability of two fresh armoured divisions,
and said that he proposed to strike hard at
the enemy now in an all-out effort rather
than ‘dribble in’ these reserves. The inten-
tion was to launch a deliberate assault across
the ridge which curved south-westward from
Calcar to beyond Uedem, and having
breached the enemy’s strong Hochwald
defences to exploit towards Xanten and
Wesel. The task was in effect the completion
of the second and third phases of Operation
‘Veritable’. To maintain the maximum pres-
sure on the enemy, every available division
would be deployed, each on a narrow front,
with the majority engaged simultaneously.
The key to final success, in the Corps Com-
mander’s estimation, lay in the capture of the
German positions at the southern end of the
Hochwald, for it was from here that exploita-
tion would achieve the best results. But first
it was necessary to secure firmly the Calcar-
Uedem ridge, both to withstand counter-
attacks from the east and to provide a base
from which the armour could advance over
the low-lying fields in front of the Hochwald.
The maintenance difficulties which had
slowed the XXX Corps’ advance in the early
stages of ‘Veritable’ emphasised the need for
securing a route along which the momentum
of the coming offensive could be sustained to
a successful conclusion. Of three possible
routes forward the northern axis Moy-
land–Calcar–Xanten would be the most
obvious choice in the enemy’s eyes. In addi-
tion to this disadvantage, air photographs
showed the road to be badly cratered, and
deployment, especially on the left, would be
limited by flooding. A southern route
through Goch, Kervenheim and Sonsbeck
would have to serve the XXX Corps also,
with resultant congestion. But in the centre
the Goch–Xanten railway ran along a solid
embankment which was reported to be free
of mines and untouched by demolition. Most
fortunately the line traversed the gap which
separated the Hochwald forest from the
smaller Balberger Wald. This axis was Gen-
eral Simonds’ choice. His engineers would
tear up the track and develop the roadbed
for traffic as the battle moved forward.
The initial blow would fall on the plateau
immediately south of Calcar; for not only
was this an important objective in itself, but
an attack here might mislead the enemy into
expecting a drive along the northern axis and
conceivably cause him to draw his reserves in
that direction, leaving the Uedem end of the
ridge more vulnerable to assault. The task
was given to the 2nd Canadian Division.
Striking at 4.30 a.m. on the 26th, Major-Gen-
eral Bruce Matthews, with the support of two
regiments of the 2nd Canadian Armoured
Brigade, was to put two brigades astride the
road from Goch where it climbed over the
ridge. At the same time on Matthews’ right a
By Colonel Charles P. Stacey
battalion of the 8th Canadian Infantry
Brigade from the 3rd Canadian Division
would secure high ground just north of Kep-
peln, a village which formed an intermediate
strongpoint between Calcar and Uedem
where the enemy’s flanks were anchored.
Once the northern end of the ridge was
secure, the second phase of ‘Blockbuster’
would see the 3rd Canadian Division (Major-
General Daniel Spry) capturing Keppeln
with the balance of his 8th Brigade, while
2,500 yards farther east a battle-group from
the 4th Canadian Armoured Division would
push southward between the 2nd and 3rd
Infantry Divisions to extend their hold on
the ridge as far as Todtenhügel. In Phase
Three (not to begin before midday) the
Corps thrust would continue towards the
south, with Spry passing the 9th Infantry
Brigade through against Uedem — which
would also be threatened from the north-east
by the 4th Armoured Brigade group. At the
same time the 11th Armoured Division
would pass south of Uedem to seize the
southernmost tip of the ridge where it
petered out north-east of Kervenheim.
The final phase was to be the armoured
break eastward. Crossing the ridge east of
Uedem the 4th Armoured Division’s
infantry brigade would head over the flats to
seize positions astride the railway where it
passed through the Hochwald gap. On the
Corps right the 11th Armoured Division,
continuing its advance south-eastward,
would capture Sonsbeck and put a brigade
3
SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF THE ETO
THE VICTORY CAMPAIGN
For ‘Blockbuster’ the First Canadian Army deployed two corps,
II Canadian Corps on the left and British XXX Corps on the right.
The Canadians, with two British divisions under command,
would attack south-eastwards from the line of the Goch–Calcar
road and, after the initial objective, the Uedem–Calcar ridge,
on the high ground to the north. It would be
the task of the two Canadian infantry divi-
sions to follow up and protect the armoured
divisions’ flanks. Exploitation would depend
on developments, the armour probably being
directed on Xanten and Wesel.
A gigantic artillery programme was to
back the operation. The barrages for the first
phase would come from 12 field, six medium
and three heavy regiments in support of the
2nd Division, and seven field and two
medium regiments on the 3rd Division’s
front. In subsequent phases the 3rd and 4th
Divisions would be supported on a similar
scale, and heavy concentrations would be
available on call should the enemy’s resis-
tance prove unusually strong. During the
final phase each armoured division would be
supported by three field and five medium
regiments.
The air plan for ‘Blockbuster’ utilised all
available aircraft. Of 25 targets selected for
attack, fighter-bombers would take on 18
4
had been secured, launch two armoured divisions against the
Hochwald Layback. XXX Corps would advance on a parallel
course, protecting the Canadian right flank and clearing the
country alongside the Maas river, and then turn east, deploying
armour too, to facilitate the link-up with the Americans.
This period brought very welcome news
from the American front. On February 23
Operation ‘Grenade’, so often put off
because of the Roer flooding, was launched
at last. At 3.30 that morning, after a brisk 45-
minute bombardment, the US Ninth Army
(Lieutenant General William H. Simpson),
began crossing the river on a two-corps front
in the Jülich sector. Simultaneously the US
First Army (Lieutenant General Courtney
H. Hodges), charged with protecting Simp-
son’s right flank, assaulted astride Düren.
Opposition was slight, for the enemy had
been forced to denude this part of his front
to meet General Crerar’s offensive farther
north. By the end of the first day 28 infantry
battalions were east of the Roer, and early
on the 24th 11 traffic bridges and a number
of ferries and footbridges were carrying
troops and equipment across the swollen
river. By February 26 the American bridge-
head was some 20 miles wide and ten miles
deep. At a cost of very few casualties the
covering all likely trouble spots in the path of
the advance, extending from the
Calcar–Uedem ridge to the western fringe of
the Hochwald and Balberger Wald. Medium
bombers would attack targets north of Ker-
venheim and in the woods with anti-person-
nel bombs, and carry out interdiction bomb-
ing on Kehrum and Marienbaum on the
northern flank and Sonsbeck on the south.
During the four days preceding the
launching of Operation ‘Blockbuster’ the
First Canadian Army front was compara-
tively quiet, but there was local fighting on
the XXX Corps sector. The 15th (Scottish)
Division attack north-east of Weeze on the
22nd gained ground in the face of heavy
opposition; the 53rd (Welsh) Division’s on
the 24th met still fiercer resistance, and on
the morning of the 25th, when it was appar-
ent that Weeze was not to be easily cleared, a
halt was called with the Welsh Division’s
foremost troops about a mile short of the
town.
With the starting date of ‘Blockbuster’ set for February 26, plans were made to relieve
some of the infantry divisions that had been heavily involved in ‘Veritable’, the offen-
sive through the Reichswald, notably the 15th (Scottish) and 51st (Highland) Divisions.
However, before this could be effected, the Scottish Division was in for some heavy
fighting. Pushing south from Goch, it found itself engaged in exceptionally fierce com-
bat around the Forsthaus Kalbeck, a stone-walled forester’s lodge in the boggy woods
just south of the Goch–Xanten railway. The Forsthaus became a hotly contested
bastion when the I. Bataillon of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 7 reached it in a counter-
attack on February 20 and dug in around it, holding up first the 2nd Gordon High-
landers and then the 6th Royals Scots Fusiliers. Bitter close-quarters combat raged for
two days, until the Scottish 46th Brigade, supported by Churchill tanks, finally pushed
the Germans back beyond the Forsthaus on the 22nd. Here captured Fallschirmjäger
are lined up against the wall that surrounds the courtyard of the house.
soon (February 27) to be squeezed into
reserve and begin training for the Rhine
crossing. Waiting to renew its attack on
Weeze and advance south-eastward along
the Goch–Geldern railway was the 53rd
(Welsh) Division, led by Major-General
Bobby Ross; while on its left the British 3rd
Division, under Major-General Lashmer
Whistler, which had just relieved the 15th
(Scottish) Division, was directed on Kerven-
heim and Winnekendonk. When the time
was ripe for exploitation General Horrocks
would commit the Guards Armoured Divi-
sion. This was the only armoured division
assigned a role in the early stages of Opera-
tion ‘Veritable’; yet up to now ground condi-
tions had been such that only its infantry for-
Ninth Army had collected close to 6,000 pris-
oners. By the evening of February 25 Gen-
eral Simonds had completed the consider-
able regrouping which the ‘Blockbuster’ plan
entailed. The 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divi-
sions had changed places; the latter was now
on his right. The 43rd (Wessex) Division
(Major-General Ivor Thomas), which had
come under command on the 21st, was
between Moyland and the Rhine; its task was
to protect the left flank and take over cap-
tured ground. The 4th Canadian Armoured
Division (Major-General Chris Vokes) had
assembled in the Cleve area, ready to drive
forward between the two Canadian infantry
divisions; while the 11th Armoured Division
(Major-General G. P. B. Roberts) was mov-
ing towards the north-eastern edge of the
Reichswald, whence at the appropriate time
it would be launched along the Corps’ right
flank.
Between the Canadian Corps and the
Maas, the XXX Corps, forming the army’s
right wing, stood ready to deal with any
counter-attacks developing from the south.
Next to the river, near Afferden, was the
52nd (Lowland) Division under Major-Gen-
eral Edmund Hakewill-Smith. The 51st
(Highland) Division, south of Goch, was
mation, the 32nd Guards Brigade, had had
active employment. Since February 13 it had
been fighting with the 51st Division west of
Goch.
On February 25, the day before ‘Block-
buster’ was to open, General Crerar drew the
attention of his corps commanders to the
need for reconsidering the general plan
because of the enemy’s determined resis-
tance in front of Weeze. He was concerned
that the delay in clearing the lateral road
from Weeze to the Maas river at Well would
prevent early construction of the
Wanssum–Well bridge, which was important
for the XXX Corps’ maintenance. (The east-
ern end of the bridge site was finally cap-
tured on the night of March 3/4 by troops of
The present inhabitants of the Forsthaus, the Wunderlich family, allowed Karel
Margry to match up the picture. The outer side of the wall is still splattered with
pock-marks — graphic evidence of the heavy fighting that once raged around here.
5
ATB

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