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LOST VICTORIES
BY
FIELD-MARSHAL
ERICH VON MANSTEIN
Edited and translated by
ANTHONY G. POWELL
Foreword by
CAPTAIN B.H. LIDDELL HART
Introduction to this Edition by
MARTIN BLUMENSON
DEM ANDENKEN UNSERES
GEFALLEN SOHNES GERO v. MANSTEIN
UND ALLER FÜR DEUTSCHLAND
GEFALLENEN KAMARADEN
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
by Martin Blumenson
FOREWORD
by Captain B. H. Liddell Hart
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE
Part I. The Campaign in Poland
1. BEFORE THE STORM
2. THE STRATEGIC POSITION
3. THE OPERATIONS OF SOUTHERN ARMY GROUP
Part II. The Campaign in the West
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
4. THE ECLIPSE OF O.K.H.
5. THE OPERATION PLAN CONTROVERSY
6. COMMANDING GENERAL, 38 ARMY CORPS
7. BETWEEN TWO CAMPAIGNS
Part III. War in the East
8. PANZER DRIVE
9. THE CRIMEAN CAMPAIGN
10. LENINGRAD - VITEBSK
11. HITLER AS SUPREME COMMANDER
12. THE TRAGEDY OF STALINGRAD
13. THE 1942-3 WINTER CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH RUSSIA
14. OPERATION 'CITADEL'
15. THE DEFENSIVE BATTLES OF 1943-4
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX II
APPENDIX III
APPENDIX IV
MILITARY CAREER
GLOSSARY OF MILITARY TERMS
ILLUSTRATIONS
MAPS
Key to Symbols used in Maps
1. German and Polish Deployment, and Execution of German Offensive.
2. Southern Army Group's Operations in Polish Campaign.
3. The O.K.H. plan of Operations for German Offensive in the West.
4. Army Group A's Proposals for German Operations in the West.
5. 38 Corps' Advance from the Somme to the Loire.
6. 56 Panzer Corps' Drive into Russia.
7. Situation of Northern Army Group on 26th June 1941 after 56 Panzer Corps'
Capture of Dvinsk.
8. Encirclement of 56 Panzer Corps at Zoltsy (15th-18th July 1941).
9. 56 Panzer Corps' Drive into Flank of Thirty-Eighth Soviet Army on 19th August
1941.
10. Battle on the Sea of Azov and Breakthrough at the Isthmus of Perekop (Autumn
1941).
11. Breakthrough at Ishun and Conquest of the Crimea (Autumn 1941).
12. Re-Conquest of the Kerch Peninsula (May 1942).
13. Conquest of Sevastopol (June-July 1942).
14. Battle of Lake Ladoga (September 1942).
15. Situation on German Southern Wing at end of November 1942: the Struggle to
free Sixth Army.
16. Winter Campaign 1942-3: Don Army Group's Struggle to keep Army Group A's
rear free.
17. Winter Campaign 1942-3: Don Army Group's Battles to keep Communications
Zone free.
18. Winter Campaign 1942-3: German Counterstroke, the Battle between Donetz and
Dnieper.
19. Winter Campaign 1942-3: German Counterstroke, the Battle of Kharkov.
20. Operation 'Citadel' (July 1943).
21. Battles Fought by Southern Army Group 17th July-30th September 1943.
22. The Fight for the Dnieper Bend.
23. Battles Fought by Southern Army Group up to mid-February 1944.
24. Developments on Southern Wing of Eastern Front at end of March 1944.
PLATES
The Author, 1944
With members of the German minority in Siebenbürgen, accompanied by his son,
Gero, and Lt. Specht
At H.Q. 50 Division in the Crimea
With Col.-Gen. Dumitrescu
Southern coastline in the Crimea
Maxim Gorki I
Sevastopol on fire
Russian Battery at entrance to Severnaya Bay
Crimean meeting with Marshal Antonescu
With Baron v. Richthofen at Kerch, May 1942
Caravan conference before Leningrad
Conference with Gen. Kempf and Gen. Busse, during 'Citadel'
H.Q. at Vinnitsa
INTRODUCTION
by Martin Blumenson
Everything in war is simple, Clausewitz said; but the simplest thing, he added, is incredibly
difficult.
Consider the basic relationship between politics and war. Clausewitz made the equation
crystal clear, even simplistic, in his classic dictum that war is an extension of politics by
different means. In other words, political ends govern the exertions of war. Or, the military
are the means by which to gain political goals. The political leaders establish the objectives,
the military men seek to attain them.
Nothing could be simpler or more obvious. This is the essential definition of war: organized
violence in quest of political advantages. Otherwise, conflict and killing are meaningless and
immoral.
Clausewitz expressed this very plainly in his monumental study of the nature of war. But
beyond some general observations and several specific illustrations, he could not
systematically examine the other side of the coin, the politics to which war is attached, for he
lacked a complementary treatise on the nature of international politics.
If the primacy of the political over the military is beyond question, the application of the
relationship in the real world poses problems of terrible complexity. Political wishes and the
military methods to realize them, political motives and the military procedures to support
them, are seldom clear-cut and in balance at any given moment. They are anything but easy to
synchronize. Furthermore, where is the fine and sometimes invisible line between the political
and military spheres?
The case of Adolf Hitler is instructive. Apart from the fatal flaws that finally crushed him, he
was for a time a political genius.
Whether he followed a blueprint or extemporized, he gained striking political triumphs.
Without resorting to force, he remilitarized the Rhineland, annexed Austria, and conquered
Czechslovakia. He thereby expanded the territory and the power of Germany. Even when he
used military means in Poland to obtain his political desires, he demonstrated the close
connection between politics and war.
Unfortunately for him, his invasion of Poland precipitated World War II. From then on, his
direction of the war became increasingly military and less political. Towards the close, the
fighting he exhorted degenerated into senseless destruction for the sake merely of continuing
the struggle, and that was hardly a proper political objective.
Erich von Manstein, whether deliberately or unconsciously, has illuminated the steady decline
of Hitler's outlook and the constant deterioration of Germany's war effort. As Hitler assumed
more and more the military functions and concerned himself with military decisions, no one
exercised the political role. And without that, the bloodshed and sacrifice were without
reason.
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