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Colby Quarterly
Volume 19
Issue 1
March
March 1983
Article 4
"The Eye Altering Alters All": Blake and Esthetic
Perception
Nicholas O. Warner
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Colby Library Quarterly, Volume 19, no.1, March 1983, p.18-28
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Warner: "The Eye Altering Alters All": Blake and Esthetic Perception
"The Eye Altering Alters All":
Blake and Esthetic Perception
by NICHOLAS O. WARNER
THE current climate of critical diversity and methodological exper-
imentation, it is natural to speculate on the value of various critical
theories in approaching the notoriously recalcitrant work of William
Blake. Among the plethora of such approaches, two that reveal a strik-
ing affinity with Blake's own esthetic theories and practice are E. H.
Gombrich's concept of "the beholder's share" and Wolfgang Iser's
phenomenologically based theory of reader-response. Blake's work is,
of course, in no way reducible to the concerns of these or any other criti-
cal methodologies. But the two approaches to be discussed here provide
a useful theoretical framework for studying Blake, in addition to the
critical perspectives that have already been applied to his work.
1
The in-
sights of both Gombrich and Iser, those of the former applied to Blake's
art, those of the latter to his writing, are particularly helpful in achiev-
ing the "energy of response" that Blake, as Northrop Frye long ago
observed, demands.
2
Their specific connections to Blake lie in an anti-
Lockean epistemology which affirms the active nature of perception,
and in their emphasis on the artist's transformation of traditional mate-
rial. Before going on to a closer examination of these connections, we
would do well to begin by looking at the clues that Blake himself gives
us for probing his work and our relationship to it.
I
N
I
BLAKE repeatedly seems to call for a critical approach geared to creative
perception and response: "A fool sees not the same tree that a wise
man sees"; "The Sun's Light when he unfolds it / Depends on the
I am grateful to the American Philosophical Society for a grant from the Penrose Fund which made
completion of this article possible.
1. Among recent studies to view Blake through critical lenses other than the archetypal one developed
by Frye, the most notable are, to my mind, Anne Mellor's
Blake's Human Form Divine
(Berkeley:
Univ. of California Press, 1974), which discusses Blake's work in terms of WOlfflin's theories of open
and closed form; W.
J.
T. Mitchell's
Blake's Composite Art
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978), a
study of visual-verbal connections in Blake that often employs a structuralist perspective; Diana Hume
George's
Blake and Freud
(Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1980), in which each of these figures is read in
terms of the other; and Leopold Damrosch,
Jr.
's
Symbol and Truth in Blake's Myth,
a densely allusive
work that draws heavily on French linguistic and structuralist criticism. Gombrich partially informs
Mellor's and Mitchell's discussions of Blake, but Iser's work, as far as I know, has never been related to
Blake.
2. Northrop Frye,
Fearful Symmetry
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969), p. 7.'
18
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Colby Quarterly, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 4
NICHOLAS O. WARNER
19
Organ that beholds it"; "the Eye altering alters all"
(E.,
pp. 35, 257,
476).3 Again and again Blake insists that what our eyes behold is partly
the product, as well as the object, of our own perception. This view of
the relativity and creativity of perception forms one of the most impor-
tant themes of that central work in the Blakean canon,
The Marriage of
Heaven and Hell
(still one of the best glosses on Blake's thought). Ger-
mane to the whole work is the paradox that one angel's heaven is an-
other's hell, or perhaps that one angel's hell is a devil's heaven. Even
humanity's fall is seen from two entirely different viewpoints: "It in-
deed appear'd to Reason as if Desire was cast out, but the Devils ac-
count is, that the Messiah fell.
&
formed a heaven of what he stole from
the Abyss"
(MHH, E.,
p. 34). And, in one of the Memorable Fancies
from
The Marriage,
Blake gives his theory of perception a humorous
twist in the narrator's description of his encounter with a pompous
angel. After showing the narrator a vision of Leviathan, "advancing
toward us with all the fury of a spiritual existence," the angel fearfully
. . . clim'd up from his station into the mill; I remain'd alone,
&
then this appearance
was no more, but
I
found myself sitting on a pleasant bank beside a river by moon-light
hearing a harper who sung to the harp,
&
his theme was, The man who never alters his
opinion is like standing water,
&
breeds reptiles of the mind.
But
I
arose, and sought for the mill,
&
there
I
found my Angel, who surprised asked
me, how
I
escaped?
I
answerd. All that we saw was owing to your metaphysics. . . .
(MHH, E.,
pp.
40-41)
This parable of the relativity of perception demonstrates Blake's
belief that seeing is not mere sensation, but a process contingent on
expectations and preconceptions as well as on sensory data. In matters
of perception, as in so much for Blake, "One Law for the Lion
&
Ox is
Oppression"
(MHH, E.,
p. 43). The eye contributes to the reality it per-
ceives, as Blake never tires of asserting, most notably in his famous
letter to the Reverend Dr. Trusler, and in
A Vision of the Last Judg-
ment.
In the letter to Dr. Trusler (August 23, 1799), Blake answers the rever-
end's charge of obscurity. His response turns into a manifesto affirming
the relativity of perception and the importance of perceiver involvement
in the comprehension of art: "You say that I want somebody to eluci-
date my Ideas. But you ought to know that What is Grand is necessarily
obscure to weak men. That which can be made Explicit to the Idiot is
not worth my care. The wisest of the Ancients considerd what is not too
Explicit as the fittest for Instruction because it rouzes the faculties to
act"
(E.,
p. 676).
A few sentences later, Blake gives us one of his fullest statements on
3. All references to Blake's writings are taken from David V. Erdman's
The Poetry and Prose of
William Blake
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1970), cited in the text as
E.
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Warner: "The Eye Altering Alters All": Blake and Esthetic Perception
20
COLBY LIBRARY QUARTERLY
the significance of individual differences in perception and on the im-
portance of the inner eye in determining what the outer eye beholds:
I see Every thing I paint In This World, but Every body does not see alike. To the Eyes of
a Miser a Guinea is more beautiful than the Sun,
&
a bag worn with the use of Money has
more beautiful proportions than a Vine filled with Grapes. The tree which moves some to
tears of joy is in the Eyes of others only a Green thing that stands in the way . . . As a
man is So he Sees. As the Eye is formed such are its Powers.
(E.,
p. 677)
From Blake's letter, we can see that what troubles him is not a simple
difference of opinion or perspective, but rather the arrogant, positivistic
denial of the existence or validity of his own visions. Blake contemptu-
ously rejects the assumption that perception is a passive and objective
affair, the mere registration of stimuli on an inactive observer. "As a
man is, So he Sees," Blake tells Trusler; the perception and evaluation of
beauty (the sun above a guinea, a vine of grapes above a sack of money)
reflect the inner condition of the perceiver. Yet Blake could just as easily
have said, "As a man sees, so he is," and, in fact, he comes close to
saying just that in
Jerusalem:
Los rolled, his Eyes into two narrow circles, then sent him
Over Jordan; all terrified fled: they became what they beheld.
If perceptive Organs vary: Objects of Perception seem to vary:
If the Perceptive Organs close: their Objects seem to close also
(30:53-56,
E.,
p. 175)
For Blake, perception involves creation. Thus, by looking only through
the narrow chinks of his cavern, Dr. Trusler creates a frighteningly nar-
row sense of reality in which he himself is trapped; because he refuses to
look beyond the confines of "This World," he can know no other
reality than that which "This World" offers.
The reader will have noticed that Blake's statements on the general
nature of perception in his letter to Dr. Trusler are fused with his theory
of perception on the esthetic plane. Without transition or qualification,
Blake's ideas of perceptual activity carryover to a consideration of
works of art and their perceivers. By placing so much emphasis on the
role of the audience, Blake makes the work of art depend on the per-
ceiver for any meaningful existence. The work comes into being only
through the consciousness of the reader or viewer whose faculties are
sufficiently roused. By the same token, that "which is too Explicit" in a
work of art precludes the kind of esthetic engagement Blake calls for. In
part, this explains how Dr. Trusler, at the sanle time that he condemns
Blake's work as fantastic, refuses to rouse his own faculties to meet the
challenging difficulty (by Blake's own admission) of that work. By so
doing, Trusler merely perpetuates the limited reality he perceives, and
ends up resembling the angel in
The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,
de-
tecting in Blake's work not the sublime songs of a harper, but only a
chaotic, fearsome Leviathan.
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Colby Quarterly, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 4
NICHOLAS O. WARNER
21
One of the more striking contrasts in Blake's letter, that between sun
and guinea, reappears in different form just over a decade later, when it
plays a significant role in the conclusion to Blake's
A Vision of the Last
Judgment
(1810), a highly important document in Blake's theories of
perception:
Error or Creation will be Burned Up
&
then
&
not till then Truth or Eternity will appear It
is Burnt up the Moment Men cease to behold it I assert for My self that I do not behold
the Outward Creation
&
that to me it is hindrance
&
not Action it is as the dirt upon my
feet No part of Me. What it will be Questiond When the Sun rises do you not see a round
Disk of fire somewhat like a Guinea 0 no no I see an Innumerable company of the
Heavenly host crying Holy Holy Holy is the Lord God Almighty I question not my
Corporeal or Vegetative Eye any more than I would Question a Window concerning a
Sight I look thro it
&
not with it.
(E.,
p. 555)
In these last sentences of
A Vision of the Last Judgment,
far from being
the disoriented dreamer occasionally depicted both by admirers and
detractors, Blake demonstrates his awareness of what we generally call
the "real world" precisely through the very comparison he uses to dis-
miss the ultimate importance of that world. Blake knows full well that
to most of us the sun indeed looks like a fiery yellow coin in the sky, but
what is more important to Blake is how his imagination and the sun fuse
to produce a vision of divinity emerging through the physical. Like
Pliny before him, Blake considered the mind to be the "real instrument
of sight and observation," while "the eyes act as a sort of vessel receiv-
ing and transmitting the visible portion of the consciousness."4 The
truest kind of perception is a senli-receptive, semi-creative state in
which, as another Romantic poet was to put it, "we receive but what we
give" (Coleridge, "Dejection: An Ode").
II
of the statements we have examined so far are echoed in E. H.
Gombrich's masterpiece of esthetic analysis,
Art and Illusion.
Like
Blake, and like members of the modern phenomenological school such
as Ernst Cassirer and Aron Gurwitsch,5 Gombrich challenges the
Lockean split between sensation and perception: "The whole distinction
between sensation and perception, plausible as it was, had to be given
up in the face of evidence from experiments with human beings and
animals. Nobody has ever seen a visual sensation, not even the impres-
sionists, however ingeniously they stalked their prey."6 One may be
MANY
4. Pliny, quoted in E. H. Gombrich,
Art and Illusion
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1972), p.
15.
5. See, for example, Cassirer's "The Concept of Group and the Theory of Perception," in
Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research,
V (September 1944), 1-35, and Gurwitsch's "The Phenomenol-
ogy of Perception: Perceptual Implications," in James M. Edie, ed.,
An Invitation to Phenomenology
(Chicago: Quadrangle, 1965), pp. 17-29.
6. Gombrich, p. 298.
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