067 WAR MACHINE.pdf

(49586 KB) Pobierz
Yolume
6
Issue
6Z
Forthcoming issues
featwe:
Po$-wu
Attack Aircraft
ftSfished
by
3Sis
Publishing Ltd
Q
Aerospace Publishing
Ltd
1984
Editorial
O{fices
Modern
Machine
Pi$ols
and
SMG
Allied
lighters
of
World
Wu II
Modern Missile Submuines
Heavy
Artillery
of
World
"lar
Machine
Aerospace Publishing Ltd
"3
Barley
Mow
Passage
-ondon W4
4PH
Xanaging Editor:
Stan
Morse
Editorial
:
Trisha Palmer
Chris Bishop
Chris Chant
Design:
Rod
Teasdale
Wu
II
ColourOrigination:
lmago Publishing
Thame, Oxon
Ltd,
Typsetting:
Artists:
SX
Composing
Ltd
Film
work;
Precise
Litho
Ltd
Ray Hutchins
Consultant
Editor: Major
General
Sir
Jeremy
Moore
KCB OBE
MC, Comman-
John
Ridyard
Peter Sarson
& Tony
Bryan
der
of
British
Land Forces
during
the
Falklands campaign.
'3U12
Distribution
and
marketing
offices:
Printed
in
Great Britain
by The
Artisan
Press Ltd
Picture
acknowledgements
CoE
photognph:
hnperial
War
MNew. l32l:
Imperial
Wil
Mmeur/Robert
Hut
Librny.
1322:
Impenal War
M$eum.
1323:
Robert
Hut
Libnry.
1324:
Imperial
Wd
Mweuri^mperial
War
MNem.
1325:
Irnperial War
Msew.
1326i
Imperial War
Mreeum./Impedal
Wd
M6ew.
L327t T.l./T.1. 1328t
T.J./I'.J.
1329:
Imperial
Wil
Mueum/Imperial War
MNew.
1332:
Imperial
Wd
M$eun/Iroperial
War
MNem.
1333:
Inpedal
War
Mmem.
1334;
Imperial
Wil
MNeum/T.J.
1335:
T.J.nmpenal
Wil
Mueum.
133?;
lmperial War
Muew.
1338:
Imperial War
Museum,/T.J. 1339:
Irnperial
Wu
Mueul4\4ARS,
Lincs.
1340:
Impedal War MNeum.
(iii)r
US
Army/Hughes Helicopters.
(iy):
US
Au
Force,/US
Amy.
Subscription Manager:
Christine Allen
0488 72666
Circulation Director:
David Breed
Marketing Direstor:
Michael Joyce
Orbis
Publishino Ltd
Orbis
House "
2O-22
Bedtordbury
London
WC2N
4BT
Telephone:
01-379 6711
HOWTO OBTAIN
ISSUESAND
BINDERS FORWAR MACHINE
UVEIRE
PRICE:80p/lRl1
SUBSCRIPTION:
6
1
EUROPE
PRICET
80p
SUBSCRIPTION:
6
1
MIDDLEEAST
PRICE:80p
SUBSCRIPTION:
air:
f42.'t2
air:
rface:
'1
air:
surface:
BINDER: e5.50
AIRN/AiL:
f8.30
6
AMERICAS/ASIA/AFRICA
PRICE: US$'1.95/80p
SUBSCBIPTION:
AUSTRALIA/FAR
EAST
PRICE:80p
SUBSCRIPTION:
Months: f23.92
Months
Months
Year: f47 .84
BINDEB:
Please
send 83.95
per
binder. ortake advantage
of our
special offer
in
early
issues.
Year
surfae:
su
air: 184.24
rface: e67.08
Year
su
t44.98
t42.12
e89.96
L84.24
6Months
1
Year
air:
f53.30
surtace: f42.12
air:
e106.60
surface;
f84.24
BINDER:
f5.50
AIRMAIL:
fl9.50
BINDER: €5.00
AIRMAIL:
€5.50
ai:
f57.46
surtace: f42.12
1
Year
ai
t114.92
sufiacet
f84.24
BINDER:f5.50
AlRlvlAlL: f10.00
6
Months
MALTA
Obtain BINDERS
from
SOUTHAFRICA
PRICE: R2.35
Obtain BINDERS
from
any
branch
of
Central
AUSTRALIA
PRICE:
AUS$2.25
Obtain BINDERS from
First Post Pty Ltd,
23
Chandos
Street
St
Leonards,
NSW 2065
yournewsagentor
Miller(lvlalta) Ltd,
MAVassalli Street,
Valetta, Malta
Price:
f3.95
NewsAgencyor
lntermag,
PO
Box
57394, Springfield
2137
SINGAPORE
PRiCE: Sing$2
obtain
BINDERS
from
MPH
Distributors
601
Sims Drive
o3-o7-21
NEWZEALAND
PRICE: NZ$2.80
Obtain BlNDERSfrom
your newsagent or
Gordon & Gotch
(NZ)
Ltd.
PO
Box
1
595,
Wellington
1
Singapore
438
ADDRESS
FOR
BINDERS
AND
BACK ISSUES
CIbis Publishing
Limited
Ci]is
House
2G22 Bedfordbury
NOTE
Binders
and back
issues
are
obtainable subject
to
availability
of
stocks. Whilst every
attempt
is
made
to
keepthepriceof theissuesandbindersconstant,lhe
publishers reserve the right to increase the stated
prices
at
any
time when circumstances dictate. Binders
depicted
in
this publication
arethose producedforthe
U K
and
Australian markets only. Binders and lssues
may
be
subject to import duty and/or
local
taxes,
which
are
not included
in
the above prices unless stated.
-ordon
,,tc2N
4BT
Telephone:
01-379-521
1
ADDRESS
FOR
SUBSCRIPTIONS
Orbis Publishing Limited
Hurst Farm
Baydon
Road
Lambourne Woodlands
Newbury
Berks
RG167TW
Telephone: 0488-72666
All
cheques/Postal Orders should
be
made
payable
to Orbis
Publishing Limited. Postage
and
packaging
is
included
in
subscription rates,
and
prices
are
given
in
Sterling.
ireques./Postal
Orders should be made payable to Orbis Publishing Limited.
3 rcier prices include postage and packing
and
prices
are in steri
ing.
:-k
lssues
are
sold
at
the cover price,
and
we
do
not charge carriage
in
the
UK.
FrenchTrnks
of\IVorld\|/arll
Fromthe
birthof
thetankin
1916, the
Brtfishledthewoildin
both
the
desigm
and,
use
of armowed
forces,
hut
by
1939
internal
anny politics
and
mistaken
tactical
doctrine had
rcbbed Britain
of
this important
and
hard-won advantage.
World
War
II
period,
Some
of
them
(such
as
the
British
Valentine,
Matilda
and
Churchill)
were
eventually turned into good
frghting
The
tanks
discussed here are
amonq some
of
the Ieast successful of the
Insistence
that
tanks
which
took the place
of
cavalry
should above all
be fast
caused British tanks
to
be
thinly
protected and
inadequately armed.This
is a
Armoured
Division.
CruiserMklVof
the
Ist
machines, but
workrng
in
a
rush and
without
a
proper
development
base
Aom
which
to
work up their
designs many British tank designers
pro-
duced
tanks that
were
no match
irr
their
counterparts
in the
German
Panzer
units. The reasons for this
state
of
affairs
are
described
herern,
but it
is
not all
a
sorry
tale:
despite
all
their drawbacks,
these tanks
(both
Infantry and Cruiser types)
were
at
tlmes
ali
there
was
to
hand and
with
them
their crews
and commanders
learned
the important
lessons that
were
to
produce the
eventual
Ailted
victory,
Some of
the
development
and design resu_ltswere
remarkable.
Work-
ing from
a
base
where virtually
no
healy
engineering facilities
existed,
Australla was
able
to
produce
the Sentinel from scratch, and it was
no
fauit of the desrgners that
their progeny
was
never
to see action. The
same can
be
said
of
the Canadians,
who produced
the
Ram
in
a
remark-
ably
short
time, again from scratch
and
with
no tank
production
experi-
ence whatsoever.
These
two projects
must
rate
among
the more re-
markable production
feats
of
World War II,
but today they are
ii:te
known
outsrde
their
home
nations.
The
tale
of
the
Crulser
tanks
produced
by
the Unrted
Kingdom
has
b_.-
now
been
often
told but
it
still
bears re-examination
of
how
a
docirine
accepted
without
proper
investigation can affect the course of battles
even
well
past the
pornt
when the doctrine
has
been
found wanting
British and
Ailied
tank crews had
to drive their
charges
into
batia
knowing
that
their
mdn
gmns
were
too
weak, their armoured
protecticl
too
thin and their
mechanrcal
reliabrlity
all
too suspect at
a
critica_
moment,
But
they went into battle all
the same and
olten
manaqed
:c
defeat
a
better-armed
and
prepared
enemy.
Thus
while
reading
of
ihe
tanks thought must be
glven
to
the men who manned and fought them,
lcr
tanks
are but
lumps of metal constructed
in
a
certain
fashion,
and are
nothing
without
men to
drive
and use them
in
combat.
France
had somefinetanks
in
1940,
butobsessionwith
adefensive
stratery
left
her
armoured
forces unfit
to
face
the
German
onslaught. Here a
late-
model
Renault
R-35
lies
burningas
tft
e
Blitzkrieg continues.
If
ii[lcnr<iss
H-35
and
H-39 lisrht
tanks
Fitted with
the
SA
3
I
37
-
mm
L33,
the
H-39
had arespectable performance
by
1930s
standards.lts
onlymajor
dis
advantage
wa
s
th
at
the
commander had
to
work
the
gun.
During
the early
1930s
the
French
army,
in
common
wlth
many other
rts ageing tank parks
with
modern
equipment,
At that
time
the
French fol-
lowed the current
practlce
of
dividing
tank functlons into cavalry and infantry
usage
and
one
of
',he
new
tanks
in-
European armies, decrded
to
re-equip
tended
for
cavalry
lxe
was a
desigm
known as
the
Char L6ger
Hotchkiss
H-35. But
although
intended primarily
for cavalry formation
use,
the
H-35
was
later
adopted
for
infantry support
as
well,
mal:rng it one
of the
more
impor-
tant
ofthe
French
tanks
of
the
day, The
H-35
was
a
small
vehicle with
a
crew
of
two, and
it was
lightly
armed with only
a 37-mm
(1
46-in)
shorlbarrelled
gun
and
a single
7,5-mm
(0,295-in)
machrne-Qnrn.
Armour was
also
ltgtht,
rangmg
in
the thickness
from
12
mm
(0,47
in)
to
34
mm
(1,34
in),
It was
also
rather
underpowered,
and after about
400
H-35s
had been produced
from
1936
onwards
the basic model
was
supplemented
by
the
Char
L6ger
Hotchkiss
H-39,
first produced during
were
much
greater
(eventually
run-
ning
to
over
1,000
units),
1939,
The
production
totals for the H-39
but
in
general
were able
to
surpnse
the
Germans,
but only
in
purely
local
actions,
so
many
were
either destroyed
or
caP-
tured
by
the advancinq Germans,
Al-
ways short of
mat6rre1,
the
Germans
took many
Hotchkiss
tanks into their
own serqice
as
the PzKpfw
35-H 734(f)
and
PzKpfw 39-H 735(f),
and
these
were
used for
some
years
by
second-
line
and occupation units, Many
of
the
H-35
and
H-39
tanks
later had
their
turrets removed
ald
replaced
by Ger-
man anti-tank
gurs
for
use as
mobile
tank destroyers.
Not all the
French
tanks
fell
into
Ger-
man hands. Many
were
located in the
French Mrddle
East possessions and
some
were
erther taken over
bY the
Free French
or
were
used in
action
by
the
Vichy
French during
the
campaign
in
Syna
rn
194i.
Perhaps the
Hotch]<rss
tanks
wrth
the most unusual
travel tales
were
those
taken
by
the
Germans
to
the
Soviet Uruon Ln
1941,
when
they
were
so short of tanks that even
the
captured
French vehicles
were
found
useful,
French
tank
production was
slow,
beinq
severely
limited
by a
lack
of
mass
production facilittes, and
was
constantly beset
by
labour
troubles,
even
after
1939,
The
H-39
diilered
from the
H-35
in
havrng
a
120-
rather
than 75-hp
(89,5-
rather
than 56-kW)
engnne,
and could
be
recoetnized
by
the
raised rear
decking, which
on the
H-39
was
almost
flat
compared
with
the
pronounced
slope
on
the
H-35,
Also
a
new
and
lon-
ger
37-mm
gmn
was
fitted, but
this
was
only
marginally
more
powerful
than
the
earlier
weapon
and soon
proved
to
be virtually
useless against most Ger-
man
tanks,
Both
the
H-35
and
the H-39 were
used
in
actron
in
France
in May
1940,
and both were abie
to
give a
good
account
of
themselves, However,
their
part
ln the
fightingwas more
than
dimi-
nished
by
their dismal tactical
use.
In-
stead of
being
used
en
masse (in the
way that the Germans used
their
Pan-
zer
columns),
the French
tanks
were
scattered
along the
line
in
penny pack-
ets, assigned to
local infantry
support
instead of
being used
as an effectrve
there were
few
H-35s
or
H-39s
left
ariyrvhere:
the
Middle
East
By
1945
Weight:
12,I
tonnes
Powerplant:
one Hotch}:tss
6-cyltnder
petrol engine
developing
120
hp
(89
5
fJ-35s, seen
fi
ere on
parade,
examples
survived in
small numbers,
and post-war
some
were
used to form
part of the
Israeh
army tank arm, re-
kW)
maining
Ln
service
as
late as
1956.
Specification
Hotchkiss
H-39
anti-armour
force and were able
to
make
little
impact, On
occasion they
FRANCE
Dimensions:lengrth4,22 m(13
ft
I0
in);
width
1,95
m
(6 ft 4
B 1n);
heisht
2.15
m
(7
ft0,6 in)
Performance: maximum
road
speed
36
km/h
(22.3
mph);
maximumroad
range
120
lan(74,5miles);
fording
0,85
m
(2
ft
10
in); grradient 40';
in
the
reconnaissance role
but
bolstertheinfantry.
obstacle
equipped
many French
mechanized
cavalry
units.
Although armed
with
the
ineffectual
SA
I
I
37-mm
L2I
,
they
could
still
have
pertormed effectively
insteadwere deployed
piecemeal to
0,5O
m
(
I
ft
B
rn);
trench
LBO
m
Crew:2
vertical
(5ft11ln)
Renault R
35
The
Renault R 35
had its origins
in
a
design known
originally
as
the Renault
ZM,
produced
rn
late
1934
tn
answer
to
a
French army request
for
a
new infan-
small
tank with
a
crew
of
only
hvo,
The
desigm
made much
use of cast
armour
and the
suspension
followed
the
Re-
:t.
"tl\
i*...,-,..
nault
practice
of the day,
being
of
the-
Continued
onpage
1324
Two-man
infantry
suPqort
tanks
in
the
Grcatwar
lradition,
the
R 35s
were built in
the belief that
tank
warfare
had
changed
little
since
try
support tank
to
supplement
and
eventually
replace
the ageing Renault
FT
17
which dated back
to
World War
L
Trials
of
the
new
tank
started
in
early
1935,
and in
that same
year
the
design
was
ordered
into production
without
completion
of
the
testrng
as
Germany
appeared
to
be
in
a
mood for conflict.
1918.
Before
production got under
waY it
was decrded
to
increase the
armour
basis from
30mm
(1,1Bin)
to
40 mm
(1.575 in),
The
R 35
never
entirelY rePlaced
the FT
17
1,600
had been built and
it
was
the
most
numerous French infantry tank
in
in
sewice, but
bY
1940
over
use,
Its
overall appearance was
not
unlike
that of the
FT
17,
for
it
was
a
I
acc
The
tloncornef
Raid
thought
in
the
I930s,
the spectre
of
Verdun
loomed
largein
tiemindsof
French
defence
ptinn"ri.
the
lespit-e
the
different currents
of
military
futility
of
affensivewarfare,
armour
had
only
a supporting
role
in
French
tactics.
ciiii"ia
M...,
'i,.:rr..
ar-i
it,rrj
':..r;! .l
t::., :,
q!6ffi
ot
&{&*{
dri,ii,Xia$di'l
i,bi:,1,,ffi
:
4
:;:
it
:t;t
:
t.:
re
conservatism of
the
established
staffs.
When the Germans attacteO
fiance
in May
trarnrng,
guidance and
equipmenr
and
even
they
were
immediately
iplit
up
into
penny
packets
to
try
to
plug
gaps as they
occurred'.
The
Panzers
brushed
such
small unils
asrde
in
their
headlong rush
across
the Meuse
;nJih;
north French
plain
but
by
17
May the German
advances had
become
so
great
tirat the
panzer
commanders were
ordered
to
halt
It
was
aithis
to
were
.left
over,
Equrpment was sparse,
the
tanks
involved
were
usualiy
slow and
under-
gunned and
all
the
time
tiie
armoureO
iom-
manders had
ro
fight
agarnst
lhe apathy
and
1940
the
new
armoured divisions
only
a
cotonet bur he
*ut
j*n inab;.iil;
i;
oversee
the
formation
of the
few armoured
un-
its that
the French army
was
able
to
ur."'mnt"
These
were few
enough (and
belated
ar
thar),
and
were.
only
a
holiow shell
of
what they
were
supposed
to
be,
Most tank forces
were
reiainej
rn
therr
various'iniantry
and
'cavalrv, supoort
functions
lor
the
bujk
of rhe
army,
rnciudrnci the
large
lorces
kept
sratic
behind the
Maoinor
Lrne, so
Lhe
new armoured
divisions
andbrr-
gades
had to
be
formed from whatever
units
and
returned
to
his tank
who
had been active in calhng
lor
armoureJ
formations
similar
ro
rhose
nelng nuiii
Lp
l;
Germany. In
a
military world
that"war
to
wait behind
the Maqinot Line
his
calls went
"orii"ni
unheeded but gradually de
Gaulle
qained
in
personal influence
to
the
poini where
he was
offered
a
political
post in
ihe
French
wartime
government.
De Gaulle refused
rhe post,
and instead
se-
vered his
connections
*irtr
ttie
miiii;r;ilfl=
ary
thinkings
oI
Liddell
Harr and
Fuller
To a
generatron
of
French
men and
women
the
name Charles
de
Gaulle
has
a
rinq
that
con-
j.rres up many
memories
but
to
molt
he
is strli
best
remembered
as
the man who
rallied
the
Free French
in rhe
dark
days
ihalion;;;a
iil;
German
occupalion
of
Fran6e
in
1940
Bur
even
before that
de
Gaulie
was
well
known in
milit-
ary circles
as
he was one
of
the
few men
rn the
French army who read
and
absorned
tne
miirr-
and
teqi-enli.ti";;;,x
Armoured
Divrsion,
but the drvision hardiv
ex-
l.*ted.
When he arrived
ar
hrs
posr
de
Giulle
ernbryo
slaff
and
a
rabble
olreiugees
and com
bat-weary soldiers,
But
he declded
to
strike
north from
his
location
to the
north
east
of
Sois-
sons
towards Moncornet, which
was then some
32
km
(20
miles) behind ttr*
C"i*un iinLi
*"f,
as
they
were
al
that stage
of
the
campaign
For
thrs
attack
he
could
muster no
rnore
ihai
three
battalions of
tanks, of
which
two had the
smalt
inlantry
Renault
R-35s
armed
onlv
wirh
a short
37-mm
gun
the rhird
battalon
had one
com-
pany
of rhe
excellenl Char
D-2
but
lhe orher
companies
were
newly formed,
ill-trained
and
their
tanks
had only long
37-mm guns,
In
addr-
tron to
this tank
force there
n
as
one
battalion of
infantry carried jn
commandeered
buses,
bur
virtually
no
artillery
no
air suppon
and
no
anri-
aircraft
defences,
For
all
rhis
de
Gaulie
set out
on
Lhe
mornino
oI
17
May
wi'h
rh.
drvision forcrnq
irs wai
through columns
of
hapiess ref,rgees.
En
route
to Moncornet
the
French
tanks
ran into
lttle
opposttron
unril they overrdn an unprepared
uerman reconnarssance
untt
rn a
vrllage
called
Chivres, There
a short sharp
action knocked
out
the German unit in exchanges
of
machine-
gmn
fire
and
a
few
rounds
frod
the
tant
qun"
Soon
after
a
line of
German
'B'
vehicles
irere
set on
fire
in
a
spectacular bonf,re
and
Moncor-
tound
only a
smatlering
of
rank
unirs
an
French
armourwas
all
too
oltendeployed
in
penny
packets.
makrn
geasy
meatfor
the'Geiman
ta.nki."'
Here, Hotchkiss
H-35s
and
H-Zgs
fiffer
a
street m
eastern France, unahle to
stem l/re
remorseless
advance
of
the Panzers.
;orn rn
the melee and the French
tanks
simply
ti-rrned to
the rear ana
maOe
tireii
towards the French and
a
few
anti-tank
quns
were
rushed rnto posilron,
Soon
French
tanks
were in
flames
and the
infantry units eiiher
debussed and scattered
or
turned and
,wrth,
drew,
German
self-propelled
gnrns
started
ro
paper
only.
What
units ttrere
wete
taciud
e;i.64;;
bombers
and
all
the way
the
French
tanks
were
engaged
by
various enterprising
local
untls.
stantly harassed
by
the ubiquitous
Stuka
dive-
therr stqrting point. En route they
were
con-
fft"fi;i;;
make
an
attack across the
neck
of
the
panzer
poinl
that
de
Caulle was
given
his
ordet
soldiers who simply gave up any idea
of
hghtrng. Not
all
french
units
were
affec:ed by
thls
thinkingr,
but
many
were
and
thrs factor
made itself
apparent durino de
Oaulle's attack,
De
Gau1le
had
taken
command
of
the
4ih
thought
and planning ro flight, The
FrSnch
command degenerated
into
a
state of what can
now only be
described
as
defeatism
that soon
filtered
down through
the ranks
ro
the
ordinary
that
beset
the
French
military establishmeniin
those_days,
but
the German-arrack
pul
logical
ls
low
diff,cult
to describe
th;
i"ih;;it;"J
lack of
comprehenston of armoured #arfare
force
was
1o
strike
sourh
towaids
was
overambitious
tiom
ttre
rtait tloi
exi-njp-fe,
the attack
from
the norrh
neve,
eubn srartecil.
the
German neck'
while
anotfrei-irmoureO
advance.
In
eflect de
Gaulle was
to
strike north
across
[*-th;;;;
qgns
whg contlnued
their
advances
quite ur-
affected.
But
lor
all
thls
the
raid
on
Moncornei
assumed
an
importance
rn the
At best de
Gaulle
s
venture throuqh
the
Ger-
man
lnes
to
Moncornet could be
dJscribed
as
an
armoured
rard, It
certainiy
was not
un
ut,uak
lhat wds
supposed
ro
sever ihe
Cerman,neck
Not
only
was
1r
totally
lacking
in numbe.rs and
supporhng
arms, such
as
infantry and
artillery,
but
jts
counterpart altack
Jrom the
north never
even got
beyond
lhe planning sraqe
At
besr
_:
was nothing more than
a nursance
to the Ger-
l
net lay
ahead.
Unbeknown
to
de
Gaulle
Moncornet
was
ihe
headquarters
cf the
XIX
Panzer
Corps tsfFan:
zer
Dtvision,
The
arrival
of the French
tanks
caused
a
state of
mild panic for
the rear-area
arrival
of
the
enemy
in
their
midst, but
it
was
not
soldiers
were
vrrtuaily unprepared
for
the
moving, One immediarely took control
of
a fe"w
German
tanks
emerging
from
a
field
workshop
and sent them towards
the
attackers,
whb
long before
some
active
officers
got
rhrnos
seemed equally unprepared for
their
arrr,,'al.
German
anti-aircraft
guns
started
to
spray
fire
without
any
deflnire
purpose
bur
the iwo
ra
:,
became
in
the
minds oi many
rhe
poinr
of
c.:.-
flict between
two masters
of"d"d;a;&;;--
de Gaulle and Guderian,
Jn
fact Guderian
icc
<
no
part
in the
repulsing
of
either raid.
Thai';:s
Iefl
to
hrs
subordrnates,
but de
Gaulle s
e:I
:
-
did
at ieast strike many
as
berng at least
::,
effort
to
retaliate againsi
an
enem-i
carryric
e--
-frc::
before
hrm
and a gesture of
dedance
r
French
army
lhat
was
defeated
everr
:=
:I
the German invasion began
weak
strength
with
virtually no
supporl
and
legend
out of
all
proportion
to
iis
military
worth
as
did
a
simrlar
raid carried
out
a
few
days
laier
in the
direction
of Laon.
That
too was
made
ir
de
Gaul,E

Plik z chomika:

Inne pliki z tego folderu:

Inne foldery tego chomika:

Zgłoś jeśli naruszono regulamin