Osprey - Fortress 001 - Japanese Pacific Island Defenses 1941-1945.pdf

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JAPANESE PACIFIC
ISLAND DEFENSES
1941–45
GORDON L ROTTMAN
ILLUSTRATED BY IAN PALMER
FORTRESS •
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JAPANESE PACIFIC
ISLAND DEFENSES
1941–45
GORDON L ROTTMAN
ILLUSTRATED BY IAN PALMER
Series editors
Marcus Cowper and Nikolai Bogdanovic
Contents
Introduction
Japanese island defense doctrine
Building and manning the island defenses
Establishing the defense • Japanese defensive firepower • Construction materials
Principles of construction • Types of positions • Principles of camouflage • Obstacles
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Principles of island defense
Defensive action
Island defenses – the test of battle
Cape Torokina, Bougainville, November 1, 1943
Betio Island (Tarawa Atoll) November 20–23, 1943
Makin Island (Butaritari Atoll) November 20–23, 1943
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An assessment of the Japanese defenses
The sites today
Bibliography
Index
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Introduction
Hundreds of books relate the many Pacific island battles of World War II and
the resolve of the Japanese defenders. All affirm the skillfulness of Japanese
camouflage, the tactically-sound positioning of defenses, the effective use
of terrain, the ability to develop mutually supporting positions, and the
fortifications’ ability to withstand massive firepower. While the war in the
Pacific was a war of vast distances and maneuvering on a grand scale, the island
fighting saw little movement of large, mobile forces. The nature of combat was
slow and grueling: it was fought yard-by-yard over rugged terrain in a harsh
environment against a determined and resourceful enemy. It was brutal almost
beyond description with no quarter given by either side.
This study focuses on the defenses and field fortifications constructed on
Pacific islands by the Japanese combat troops defending them. Large, permanent
fortifications are beyond the scope of this work. This book will thus concentrate
on temporary and semi-permanent crew-served weapons positions and individual
and small-unit fighting positions, constructed with local materials and some
supplied engineer construction materials. Obstacles and minefields incorporated
into the defenses are also discussed. While wartime intelligence studies and
reports provide detailed information on Japanese island defenses, little postwar
study has been undertaken. This is largely due to the temporary nature of the
defenses, their remoteness and the fact that little survives of them today.
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Concrete blockhouses such as this
one on Saipan were used for
command posts, radio stations, and
to shelter various support facilities.
Often little effort was made to
camouflage them as they were
purely bomb shelters and not
intended as fighting positions.
Japanese island defense
doctrine
Every Japanese manual from 1909 focused on the importance of offensive
action to achieve victory. What the Japanese lacked in firepower and
matériel
was to be made up for by spiritual power, superior martial values, and total
dedication to fulfilling one’s duty, even if it meant attacking a superior force
with bayonets or defending a position to the death. An officer corps evolved
which loathed defense and fixed fortifications. However, the Pacific War
became nothing more than a series of defensive battles for the Japanese, a war
of attrition that they did not have the resources to win, nor even to achieve
a stalemate.
The US Army’s 1944
Handbook on Japanese Military Forces
describes the Japanese
attitude toward defense. “The defensive form of combat generally has been
distasteful to the Japanese, and they have been reluctant to admit that the
Imperial Army would ever be forced to engage
in this form of combat. So pronounced has
been their dislike for the defensive that
tactical problems illustrating this type of
combat is extremely rare.”
The 1938 Combat Regulations (Sakusen
Yomurei),
still in effect at the beginning of the
Pacific War, called for passive defense in the
face of overwhelming enemy superiority
(unyielding resistance until additional forces
arrived to resume the offensive): prior to this
the Japanese had adhered only to the concept
of active defense. Active defense was only to
be adopted when the enemy gained local
superiority and continued until operational
initiative could be regained and the offense
resumed. In reality, because of the previous
schooling and aggressive nature of Japanese
officers, the conduct of the defense on Pacific
islands was essentially active defense. Their
goal was to halt the enemy at the water’s edge,
and if unable to decisively defeat him there
they sought to reduce his strength, and
conduct immediate counterattacks to keep
him disorganized until mobile reserves could
annihilate him.
Among the key problems Japan faced were
the vast distances involved, limited shipping,
brutal climate, and numerous health hazards.
She was compelled to defend islands in widely
varied terrain and weather conditions – from
barren, rocky, sub-arctic outposts to vast,
mountainous, rainforest-covered islands.
The initial Japanese defense concept in
the South Pacific was to establish a series
of airfields and naval bases throughout the
dense island chains. These would serve to
launch further conquests, to protect the
A double-bay bunker housing two
HMGs, each with an individual
sector of fire. Such a position would
be well camouflaged with growing
vegetation. The bunker was divided
into two compartments to prevent
both weapons from being knocked
out by a single satchel charge or
bazooka rocket.
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